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This dissertation is a collection of three empirical studies that advance towards a better understanding of how school assignment systems work in practice. The dissertation is organized around three concepts – strategic simplicity, equity and efficiency – that are central to school assignment systems. Chapter 2 focuses on strategic simplicity. Strategically simple assignment mechanisms, where participants have incentives to report their true preferences, are viewed to be desirable as they “level the playing field” (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008). The chapter documents that Hungarian college applicants often fail to report their preferences truthfully in a strategically simple college admissions environment, and asks what the causes and the consequences of this behavior are. Chapter 3 looks more closely at equity. School assignment mechanisms may not provide equal opportunity for students of different socioeconomic background, which may result in segregated schools. Chapter 3 documents that secondary schools are rather segregated in Amsterdam, and asks what the sources of school segregation are. Chapter 4 focuses on efficiency. School assignment mechanisms differ in whether they take the intensity of student preferences into account, which has a profound impact on the efficiency of the resulting assignments. The chapter compares alternative approaches to measuring the intensity of student preferences and asks whether measurement affects the ranking of popular school assignments mechanisms in order of student welfare.